

GLOBAL STRIKE TASK FORCE AND STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM:  
PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION IN THE  
FORCIBLE ENTRY MISSION

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College of any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

GLOBAL STRIKE TASK FORCE AND STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM:  
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Presented with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "transformation" challenge, both the United States Air Force and United States Army devised organizational structures to meet the demand for fast reaction expeditionary forces. One of the Air Force's structures is the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF). The Army created the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

GSTF is deployable under the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct. It leverages the standoff capability of the current bomber and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleets with new platforms, such as the F/A-22.

Deployable within 96 hours, the SBCT, while presented by the Army as an early entry force, is not conceived as a forcible entry organization.

The GSTF may be effective against anti-access strategies, but clearly lacks the ability to occupy terrain and secure lodgments. Traditional forcible entry forces lack survivability. Consequently, before friendly forces can gain the initiative, additional combat power must arrive on the scene. The solution may be an integrated GSTF-SBCT force.

The thesis concludes that, under the right conditions, SBCT components do possess capabilities applicable to forcible entry operations, and that integration with GSTF is indeed possible. However, significant gaps in joint and Service doctrine make this integration difficult.

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## ACRONYMS

AEF	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
C2	Command and Control
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
EBO	Effects Based Operations
ERO	Engine Running Offload or Onload
FM	Field Manual
GSTF	Global Strike Task Force
HHC	Headquarters, or Headquarters Company
IBCT	Interim Brigade Combat Team
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFC	Joint Forces Commander
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Commander
JP	Joint Publication
MI	Military Intelligence
MOG	Maximum on Ground
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAND	Research and National Defense
RSTA	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SJTF	Standing Joint Task Force
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Joint Versus Integrated: Making Transformation Real

We need rapidly deployable, *fully integrated joint forces*, capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully and with devastating effect [emphasis added]. (Rumsfeld 2002)

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,  
Speech at National Defense University

In one brief statement, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined what may be the greatest challenge to “transformation.” Nonetheless, whether by direction or inspiration, both the United States (US) Army and the United States Air Force (USAF) embraced transformation and produced respective approaches to the Secretary’s challenge. One USAF proposal is the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF). The primary Army proposal is the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), recently termed the “Stryker Brigade Combat Team” (SBCT). Although products of two different services, GSTF and SBCT have similar objectives--fast reaction expeditionary forces constructed from resources currently available or available in the near term.

USAF Chief of Staff General John Jumper, as Air Combat Command Commander, outlined his vision for the GSTF in the Spring 2001 edition of *Aerospace Power Journal*:

GSTF will be the US Air Force’s contribution to the nation’s kick-down-the-door force. It will better meet the needs of commanders in chief (CINC) by leveraging our current and near-future capabilities to overcome the challenges our experience has identified and the threat to theater access. GSTF will rapidly establish air dominance and subsequently guarantee that joint aerospace, land, and sea forces will enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack. It will combine stealth and advanced weapons with a horizontally integrated command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) constellation that provides lethal joint

battlespace capability. The C2ISR constellation will team space assets, UAVs, and a consolidated wide body platform that transforms data into decision-quality data for a CINC and the engaged component commanders. GSTF will be a rapid-reaction force employed within the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct and timeline while maintaining interoperability with joint, coalition, and allied assets. It will initially leverage the mass and standoff of our bomber fleet and ISR platforms, protected by the F-22, to strike targets inhibiting our ability to gain access. (Jumper 2001, 35)

General Jumper's GSTF vision, while clearly embracing transformation, retains a legacy perspective on jointness. From the above description, one can infer that, although clearly "joint" in long-term objective, the GSTF is not an "integrated" force, involving air, land, and sea forces operating in the same area of operations.

Historically, the GSTF is the newcomer to the "kick-down-the-door," or forcible entry mission. Indeed, both the US Army and the US Marine Corps possessed such forces for decades. Joint Publication (JP) 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, specifies that airborne and air assault forces are the Army's primary contribution to such operations (JP 3-18 2001, I-5). Nonetheless, as the Research and National Defense (RAND) Corporation noted in their 2000 study, *Lightning over Water: Sharpening America's Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions*, airborne and air assault forces lack "survivability and killing power for future . . . contingencies; . . . they need to have much greater survivability and lethality to operate effectively" (Matsumura 2000, 6).

*Lightning Over Water* outlined three approaches to solve this problem. The SBCT most closely resembles RAND's third option: "Introducing Maneuver to Light Forces:" "Rather than emphasizing dismounted infantry, [this] concept involve[s] . . . lightweight but highly capable vehicles that could be airlifted close to battle positions by large inter- [or] intra-theater lifters" (Matsumura 2000, 10). Moreover, this study identifies the "forced

entry” mission as a possible application of this maneuver-enhanced light force (Matsumura 2000, 10).

However, the US Army officially exempted the SBCT from the forcible entry mission. As the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Colonel Michael Mehaffey described in “Vanguard of the Objective Force,” “The brigade cannot conduct forced entry, but it provides the joint force commander an improved capability to arrive immediately behind forced entry forces and begin operations to shape the battlespace and expedite decision” (Mehaffey 2000, 1). Colonel Mehaffey and the US Army see an effective force on-scene in ninety-six hours, thereby suggesting the Service’s definition of “immediate” (Mehaffey 2000, 1).

This exemption represents the crux of the problem. Current forcible entry forces lack survivability and lethality, especially against heavy enemy forces. The GSTF may be effective against these forces, but clearly lacks the ability to occupy terrain and secure lodgments. The solution may be an integrated force.

#### Primary and Secondary Questions of this Thesis

This thesis’ primary question is, “Can SBCT components integrate as an effects-provider into the GSTF forcible entry mission?” If possible, the advantages are clear. The US could demonstrate increased resolve with the addition of ground forces into the battlespace. These forces would solidify US access to contested areas and allow the reception of additional follow-on forces. Economically, cost savings could be realized; in the short term, through more effective use of expensive air delivered munitions and, in the long term, reduce the need for redundant combat systems by blending current capabilities.

Finally, the US, through this demonstrated resolve, and effective use of weapons, may achieve its military objectives quicker.

The thesis' primary question suggests two secondary questions:

1. What are the effects desired in a forcible entry scenario?
2. Do doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) exist to support this integration?

Addressing military effects, discussion will focus upon doctrinal conditions for forcible entry success. These conditions include surprise, air superiority, lodgment isolation, ground force neutralization, environmental management, and psychological and civil-military control (JP 3-18 2001, III-1). Lower level questions addressing force mix and unique service capabilities toward the desired effect will serve as key considerations. The ultimate point to this question branch is to determine if the US Army is an effective source of operational effects for the forcible entry mission.

The other secondary question centers on doctrine and TTP. The status of both doctrine and TTPs is a prime consideration. Do they already exist, are they in production, are they being tested? The thesis will examine these questions from the Army, Air Force, and joint perspectives.

#### Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations

As defined in Student Text 20-10, "Master of Military Art and Science Research and Thesis," an assumption "is an underlying proposition or statement that must be accepted as true in order to conduct the research" (Brookes 2002, 20). Throughout the thesis, the following assumptions will apply:

1. Any suggested force mix suggested by this research must be credible.

2. It is possible to link a desired effect to a specific force or force mix.
3. GSTF is the platform into which the Army will integrate, not vice versa.
4. Both the GSTF and the SBCT are mature enough in concept to conduct this analysis.
5. The enemy will not use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons as a countermeasure to a forcible entry operation. However, consistent with contemporary anti-access scenarios, the enemy may possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Targeting and destroying WMD caches may be a clear priority to the Joint Force Commander (JFC).

Student Text 20-10 explains that limitations “are weaknesses imposed by constraints or restrictions beyond . . . [a researcher’s] control” but do not reduce the study’s importance (Brookes 2002, 20). As such, the following limitations will apply:

1. Military or civilian leaders may not want to integrate SBCT or SBCT-like components into the GSTF.
2. Specific plans and TTPs associated with the GSTF and SBCT may be classified.
3. GSTF and SBCT strengths and shortcomings, as realized through tests and exercises, may be classified.

Finally, delimitations “are constraints . . . impose[d] on the scope or content of a study so that research will be feasible” (Brookes 2002, 20). The following delimitations will apply:

1. US Army forces will be the only additional joint forces considered for integration.
2. No coalition or allied forces will be integrated.

3. Current or near-term capabilities, to include airlift, will be the only capabilities blended, if possible, as an answer to the primary question.

4. While operational and joint command and control (C2) is usually a problem, this thesis will not address the detailed C2 challenges of an integrated force. Examples of detailed C2 challenge would be hardware shortcomings and organizational structures that limit such interaction. For this thesis, the final suggested force may suggest a streamlined structure. If so, then the joint forces involved will still receive appropriate operational C2.

#### Key Terms and Definitions

Key terms that apply to this thesis include access, current (or present) capability, forcible entry, integrated, joint, and near-term capability. This thesis will apply these terms consistent with JP 1-02: *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and ongoing discussion on transformation.

Access. JP 1-02 does not directly define “access;” however, it does define “lodgment” as a key term to forcible entry operations. Lodgment is “a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations” (JP 1-02 2001, 255). For this thesis, access is a condition that allows lodgments to exist.

Current Force. JP 1-02 defines “current force” as “The force that exists today. The current force represents actual force structure and/or manning available to meet present contingencies” (JP 1-02 2001, 113). In this thesis, current force represents those weapon systems or units that declared themselves operationally capable.

Forcible Entry. JP 1-02 defines forcible entry as the “seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition” (JP 1-02 2001, 173). This definition suits the thesis’ purpose. A “kick-down-the-door” force is one that conducts forcible entry operations.

Integrated. JP 1-02 defines integrated as “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole” (JP 1-02 2001, 216). This definition applies as written.

Joint. JP 1-02 specifies that joint “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc. in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate” (JP 1-02 2001, 227). An important distinction for this thesis is that “joint” forces are not necessarily “integrated.”

Near-Term Capability. The *Department of Defense Dictionary* does not define this term, nor is there a proximate term to apply. The USAF has not specified an official timeline for the GSTF, however Army discussion targets 2007 as the year in which the interim force will be complete. For the sake of argument, “near-term capabilities” represent those military weapon systems or units expected to achieve operational capability by the year 2007. Chapter 2 to this thesis, “Literature Review,” outlines the weapon systems and personnel associated with the GSTF and the SBCT.

Task Organizing. JP 1-02 defines task organizing as “The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission” (JP 1-02 2001, 433). JP 1-02 continues by commenting, “Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to:



training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility” (JP 1-02 2001, 433). This definition applies as written.

#### Possible Outcomes of this Study

By examining force structures, their capabilities, and doctrine, this thesis will attempt to provide a perspective on the possibilities of GSTF and SBCT integration in a forcible entry scenario. As recent issues associated with military operations against Iraq demonstrate, access will be an on going problem for US forces. Furthermore, it is clear that the Department of Defense cannot expect a revival of Reagan-era defense budgets through which the Services could build independent and overlapping capabilities. “Joint” is no longer sufficient. For transformation to be successful, future forces will need to be “integrated.”

Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada), JUST CAUSE (Panama), and to a lesser extent, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) each demonstrate that the US executed or planned successful forcible entry missions in the recent past. Nonetheless, these operations were against a less sophisticated enemy. The 1944 Normandy landing and the 1950 Inchon landing aside, few recent examples of forcible entry operations against complex enemies such as Iraq, North Korea, and emerging nation-states in East Europe exist.

As always, airlift and command and control (C2) are key considerations. Literally scores of monographs, theses, studies, and reports already exist to explain shortfalls in the nation’s mobility and C2 capabilities. In order to make a unique contribution, this thesis will not directly add to these arguments. Rather, this thesis focuses upon integrating capabilities and effects. That said, limitations, such as geographic size and condition,

associated with the physical and organizational characteristics of possible forcible entry objectives are considered.

Since this specific force integration is new, it is logical to assume that specific doctrine is non-existent. Nonetheless, structures and preliminary thought in the joint environment does exist, and will serve as a basis for analysis.

This thesis may suggest that the SBCT, as a whole, or even the Stryker family of vehicles itself cannot be integrated, but this should not exclude other capabilities associated with the SBCT. In all, it is hard to imagine success in any forcible entry scenario without ground component involvement.

#### Structure of this Thesis

This thesis' structure parallels the traditional five-chapter structures associated with academic theses. This chapter, chapter 1, outlines the case to be examined.

Chapter 2 is a literature review. The literature review "provides a historical and theoretical framework" of existing thought associated with the thesis topic (Brookes 2002, 20). It discusses the availability of material, its maturity of thought, and broad themes associated with the material. This review includes material produced through 15 January 2003.

Chapter 3 discusses this thesis' research and analytical methodologies. It outlines the approach and discusses the strengths and shortcomings of the methodologies applied.

Chapter 4 "presents, explains, analyzes, and interprets the evidence produced by the methodologies" discussed in chapter 3 (Brookes 2002, 29). It represents the bulk of independent thought offered by this thesis.

Chapter 5 “states the discoveries that emerged from . . . the research evidence” (Brookes 2002, 29). It relates the results from chapter 4 to the primary and secondary research questions, thereby drawing firm conclusions.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction: The Frenzied Pace of Transformation

Present efforts toward transformation have their roots well prior to the current presidential administration. However, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 served to accelerate these efforts. As initially conceived, the US Army transformation had a thirty-year timeline, with an interim force in place by 2015. However, US Army leadership accelerated this timeline to fiscal year 2007 for the interim force and fiscal year 2008 for the first Objective Force unit (Trimble 2002, 1). While political and operational realities certainly contribute to changes in timelines, the by-product of this acceleration is an inversion in portions of the force development process. Ideally, during this self-declared revolution in military affairs, a vision would lead to doctrine, which would lead to required capabilities, thereby leading to employment tactics. Procurement and fielding would be the final steps. This is not the case, at least in practice. *Joint Vision 2010* and *Joint Vision 2020* provide the vision for sure, and the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* clearly describes future requirements. However, procurement runs at best parallel to, and often outpaces, the development of service and joint operational doctrine and TTP.

Traditional Service independence and the previously mentioned inversion serve to confound efforts toward integration. Nonetheless, ample, albeit disjointed, sources in the academic and military communities do exist to define the capabilities necessary for successful forcible entry operations.

This chapter begins by describing current thought on the anti-access threat and the force mix required for successful forcible entry operations. Following this description, the

chapter continues with a brief survey of applicable joint doctrine. Finally, it concludes with descriptions of both the GSTF and the SBCT, and discusses corresponding Service and emerging doctrine related to these force structures and forcible entry operations.

#### Describing the Problem: The Right Force for the Anti-Access Threat

As the 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrated, the US enjoys significant, overwhelming advantages on the traditional battlefield. These advantages include clearly defined area of operations, strong international support, and significant infrastructure and time to allow for a large force buildup. Operation ALLIED FORCE, and recent events surrounding military action against Iraq suggest that these advantages may not be present in future scenarios. Indeed, as Hicks and Associates, Incorporated, a Washington, DC area think-tank observed,

The first lesson of the Gulf War was “don’t give America six months,” the second was “don’t give America a safe place to park.” The access challenge stems primarily from prospective U.S. adversaries having learned the latter, and from the rapid diffusion of military technologies providing them with new and affordable capabilities for challenging U.S. expeditionary forces. While the Gulf War showed U.S. forces to be virtually unstoppable once in-theater and operating from sanctuary, it also revealed their dependence on such favorable conditions. (Hicks and Associates 2000, 6)

This observation cuts to the heart of the anti-access challenge, and Hicks and Associates are not alone in their observation.

The 2001 *QDR* acknowledges this environment and specifically identifies the anti-access scenario as a “critical operational goal” (*QDR* 2001, 30). In addition, the *QDR* further specifies the need for “complementary air and ground capabilities” that can rapidly engage enemies “in all weather and terrains” (*QDR* 2001, 30). Consistent with the *QDR*’s purposes, the document outlines only the broad requirement, and provides little additional

detail. Nonetheless, it is significant that two of the review's six "critical operational goals" clearly suggest the need a robust forcible entry capability (*QDR* 2001, 31).

The *QDR* further outlined requirements for "Standing Joint Task Forces" (SJTF):

One option will include a plan for a SJTF for unwarned, extended-range conventional attack against fixed and mobile targets at varying depths. Such an SJTF would address one of the critical operational challenges of the future--developing the capability to continuously locate and track mobile targets at any range and rapidly attack them with precision. Overcoming this challenge will require enhanced intelligence capabilities, including space-based systems, additional human intelligence, and airborne systems that can locate and track moving targets and transmit that information to strike assets. It will require the ability to strike without warning from the air, from the sea, on the ground, and through space and cyber space. It will also require that these forces be networked to maximize their combined effects. (*QDR* 2001, 34)

This requirement's importance is that it closely parallels both General Jumper's GSTF description and the USAF GSTF Concept of Operations (discussed later). If one sees the GSTF as a possible SJTF, then the capabilities and effects required by a SJTF will be important considerations when integrating Army and Air Force capabilities.

Clearly, anti-access concerns were not absent in mainstream thought prior to the 2001 *QDR*. In 2000, the RAND Corporation completed a text, *Measuring Interdiction Capabilities in the Presence of Anti-Access Strategies: Exploratory*, outlining the problems of such a scenario, and described the strike capabilities required for a quick reaction force. This text included the results of a comprehensive computer simulation involving both ground and air components as they operated in an anti-access environment. The results provide a list of required capabilities and effects as well as planning factors for success (Davis, *et al.* 2002, 146). This list closely parallels the requirements offered by the *QDR*, and provide additional insight on the capabilities required in a forcible entry scenario.

## Joint Doctrine

### Introduction to Joint Doctrine

This thesis acknowledges that anti-access is a broad term that encompasses scenarios and military options in addition to forcible entry operations. Nonetheless, the nation's forcible entry capability is a significant consideration that may be a player in future scenarios. It is the worst-case scenario for sure. JP 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations* represents current doctrinal thought on the issue and contributes significantly to this thesis' analyses. However, focusing doctrinal analyses on a single joint publication will cause these analyses to fall short. If one agrees that forcible entry operations differ from traditional operations primarily in the dimensions of time and geographic space, then he would necessarily have to examine the entire realm of joint doctrine relating to the specific sub-capabilities applicable to these operations. As such, nearly the entire set of joint publications would apply. Most notable are the following:

1. JP 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
2. JP 3-01: *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*
3. JP 3-01.4: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses*
4. JP 3-02: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*
5. JP 3-02.1T: *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*
6. JP 3-03: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*
7. JP 3-09: *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*
8. JP 3-09.3: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*

- 9. JP 3-17: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations*
- 10. JP 3-35: *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*
- 11. JP 3-52: *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*
- 12. JP 3-55: *Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition*

*Support for Joint Operations (RSTA)*

- 13. JP 3-55.1: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Airspace*

*Vehicles*

- 14. JP 3-56.1: *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*
- 15. JP 3-60: *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*
- 16. JP 4-01.1: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support for*

*Joint Operations*

- 17. JP 5-0: *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
- 18. JP 5-00.1: *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*
- 19. JP 5-00.2: *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*

As extensive as this list is, it is certainly not exhaustive. Joint doctrine addressing psychological and civil-military operations, command and control, computer system, logistics and personnel management apply as well. Given that this thesis addresses primarily operations and planning issues, upcoming discussion will focus on general trends in joint doctrine as a whole, on JP 3-18: *Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, and on JP 3-02: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, in particular.

Trends in Joint Doctrine as a Whole

Doctrine is authoritative, but not directive. This simple statement describes the inherent challenge associated with joint doctrine development. Joint doctrine needs to be



flexible enough to apply to a wide range of operations, yet detailed enough to be of value to planners. With this challenge in mind, four trends are evident across joint doctrine:

1. The JFC holds primacy over the operation. Each component and Service will support his concept, goals, objectives, and strategy.
2. No single Service or component is a sole source provider of a capability. The JFC should consider all providers, assess their strengths and weaknesses, and optimize the force mix to meet the operation's objectives.
3. Most future operations will be joint. The US fights as a joint team, but joint operations do not require that all components participate.
4. Successful integrated and joint operations require synchronization, coordination, liaison, and rehearsals.

This last trend represents the perhaps greatest weakness in US joint doctrine. While clearly supporting the concept that integration is the ultimate goal of operations, it offers few techniques to integrate below the JFC and his staff. Below this level, emphasis is on coordination and liaison, vice integration. As such, current doctrine devotes significant discussion to methods for division of the battlespace, and placement of liaison teams within each component's command organizations. If integration is to be successful, additional emphasis on how to be successful in the same battlespace, vice how to coordinate activities across area of operations, is required.

Another significant weakness is doctrinal responsiveness to changes in technology and capability. This weakness is especially evident as one tries to incorporate doctrine related to specific capabilities and tasks to a larger operation, as with incorporating the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and counterair missions into a forcible entry

operation. Each joint doctrine manual discusses phases of the respective operation or task, but offers precious few techniques for successful simultaneous activities. In other words, while acknowledging that these phases may be simultaneous, joint doctrine emphasis is on a sequential approach to the operation. As upcoming discussion indicates, GSTF technology and capabilities suggest that successful deep and strategic attacks may occur without benefit of the offensive counterair or Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses missions. However, joint logistics doctrine offers few techniques to ensure its responsiveness during such compressed operations. Certainly, joint doctrine cannot look too far into the future in its development, but broad goals related to logical future capabilities such as the ability to bypass phases in the attainment of strategic and operational objectives and goals are worthwhile endeavors.

Joint Publication 3-18: *Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*

JP 3-18 outlines three operational applications for forcible entry operations. These include operations as the initial phase of a campaign, operations within a campaign, and a *coup de main* (JP 3-18 2001, I-2). Furthermore, the publication identifies three primary capabilities available to commanders: amphibious assault operations, airborne operations, and air assault operations (JP 3-18 2001, I-4--I-5). JP 3-18 outlines five distinct and sequential phases, encompassing operations from “Preparation and Deployment” through “Termination or Transition Operations” (JP 3-18 2001, III-2--III-5).

As the above paragraph suggests, JP 3-18 has some limitations. Even though it clearly states that “forcible entry operations are normally joint in nature,” it retains a significant ground-centric perspective on these activities, as demonstrated by the identification of only ground forces as the “capabilities” available (JP 3-18 2001, I-1).

While the publication stresses the importance of airspace deconfliction, it describes the use of air and space forces as primarily shaping operations. Furthermore, the publication's discussion about operational phases strongly suggests sequential, vice simultaneous, planning and execution. The 2001 *QDR* describes the need for a more integrated and fast-acting capability.

Nonetheless, JP 3-18 identifies core conditions required for successful forcible entry operations. As discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, they include surprise, air superiority, lodgment isolation, ground force neutralization, environmental management, and psychological and civil-military control (JP 3-18 2001, III-1). As such, this document retains a significant place in this thesis' analyses. Discussions offered by the previously mentioned 2001 *QDR*, RAND monograph, and Hicks and Associates study complement the effects identified in JP 3-18. The result will be a more comprehensive list of capabilities and desired effects that meet the needs of this thesis' analyses.

#### Joint Publication 3-02: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*

In spite of its apparently narrow title, JP 3-02 complements JP 3-18 and offers significantly more detail than its broader counterpart offers. JP 3-02 addresses considerations to include command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration, logistics factors, force echelonment, and joint force integration. Noteworthy is the publication's thorough discussion about air component integration with the landing force, logistics prioritization, and the role of intelligence. It even addresses techniques to integrate air landed forces into the amphibious element (JP 3-02 2001, XV-5). As the publication's title suggests, it retains a maritime perspective, however its approach to integration and synchronization of light, heavy, and logistical

elements would prove valuable to planners of a forcible entry operation, even if amphibious elements were not involved.

Currently, there exist no comprehensive publication on par with JP 3-02 corresponding to air assault or airborne operations. JP 3-17: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations*, and JP 4-01.1: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support for Joint Operations* discuss planning techniques and considerations for aerial delivery in a hostile environment, but do not offer the depth of discussion on ground-air integration of worth comparable to JP 3-02. Given that air mobility will likely be an increasingly important consideration in the contemporary anti-access environment, efforts toward such thought would be worthwhile.

Therefore, in the absence of complete joint guidance, one looks to Service doctrine for additional thought.

### Service Doctrine

#### Service Doctrine Overview

Simply looking at what the USAF and US Army describe as “doctrine,” one sees two different approaches to development and production. At least in presentation and language, USAF doctrine closely parallels joint doctrine. Presented in a series of “Air Force Doctrine Documents” (AFDD), USAF doctrine addresses the same issues as joint doctrine, but from an airman’s perspective. Furthermore, doctrine discussion is not necessarily career field or major command specific. Alternatively, the US Army distributes its doctrine through a series of field manuals (FM). Many of these field manuals are TRADOC products, and some are products of the specific branches. Furthermore, until just recently, Army doctrine designation did not parallel the joint community. For example, prior to FM

3-0: *Operations*' release in 2002, the FM was designated as FM 100-5. The US Army has not completed this redesignation. While Service doctrine's target audience is the individual service member, the Army's decentralized approach to doctrine makes its acquisition and incorporation as a whole more difficult.

#### USAF Doctrine

Historically, theater campaign planners have taken a land-centric view of how the campaign should unfold through its various phases, then examined how airpower would support it. *This approach is no longer valid, and true joint planning requires that all components be equally involved in planning the various stages of a military campaign.* How [airpower] fits into the larger picture of a *specific* strategy will depend on numerous variables, but there should be no preconceived notions about the decisiveness of any one component. Instead of *individual component decisiveness*, it is better to plan in terms of the *required components of a decisive joint force* (emphasis in original). (AFDD 2-1.3 1999, 70)

#### AFDD 2-1.3: *Counterland*

This quotation outlines the USAF's fundamental approach to joint warfare. Legitimate as this concern may be, USAF doctrine lags far behind its US Army and joint counterparts in development. Air Force doctrine specifically addressing forcible entry operations is nearly non-existent. AFDD 2-1: *Air Warfare*, mentions "forced entry" as an "Example of Air Warfare" (AFDD 2-1 2000, 30). However, in contradiction of the above-quoted assertion, AFDD 2-1 mentions that during forced entry operations, "Friendly ground forces are inserted via various delivery methods to accomplish ground objectives, *while aerospace power operates in various supported and supporting roles*" (emphasis added) (AFDD 2-1 2000, 30). Judging from the graphical depiction in this same section, the primary supported role would be during the air mobility piece associated with airborne operations.

AFDD 2-1 is a capstone document, and one should not expect excessive detail about the role of airpower, to include both strike and mobility assets, in this document. However AFDD 2-1.1: *Counterair*, AFDD 2-1.2: *Strategic Attack*, AFDD 2-1.3: *Counterland*, AFDD 2-6: *Air Mobility*, and AFDD 2-6.1: *Airlift Operations* make no mention of the role of airpower in forcible entry operations.

While it is reasonable to note that these documents, particularly AFDD 2-1: *Air Warfare*, existed before General Jumper unveiled the GSTF in September 2001, discussion similar to the requirement for a slightly more forward vision still applies. Likewise, this thesis acknowledges that the USAF is a relative newcomer to the doctrine production scene. Nonetheless, coherent doctrine toward specific operations, to include forcible entry, is a worthwhile goal.

#### Global Strike Task Force: The Air Force Contribution to Anti-Access Operations

As mentioned in chapter 1, General Jumper outlined his vision for the GSTF in 2001. USAF Headquarters, in conjunction with Air Combat Command, is the primary GSTF proponent.

In February 2002, the USAF released its Global Strike Task Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Although brief, the document describes the current operating environment and outlines the need for such a concept based upon the ongoing anti-access challenge. The CONOPS described two forms of anti-access strategies: physical and political. Physical threats include enemy bases, naval vessels, air-breathing, and spaced-based assets. Discussion about political threats includes the loss of forward basing

opportunities. The CONOPS did not refer to the political and civil-military considerations within the enemy's country or region as a concern (CONOPS 2002, 2-3).

The GSTF CONOPS does leave room for joint participation in a forcible entry scenario. The document specifically lists capabilities that could play a role to include unconventional forces, artillery, air defense forces, and cruise and ballistic missiles (CONOPS 2002, 4).

As described in the CONOPS, the GSTF mission possesses five broad phases: intelligence preparation, deployment, conflict initiation, combat operations, and persistence. While not specifically mentioning how these phases would be sequenced, it is logical to assume that these phases may be sequential or simultaneous. Consistent with the "capabilities-based" mindset, each phase lists several capabilities that joint players could provide. However, specific mention of inter-service integration is noticeably absent from the CONOPS (CONOPS 2002, 5-7).

#### GSTF Construct

GSTF will be a rapid-reaction force employed within the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct and timeline while maintaining interoperability with joint, coalition, and allied assets. It will initially leverage the mass and standoff of our bomber fleet and ISR platforms, protected by the F-22, to strike targets inhibiting our ability to gain access. (Jumper 2001, 35)

USAF Chief of Staff General John Jumper  
"Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept,  
Forged by Experience"

An aerospace expeditionary force (AEF) is an organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities that provides warfighting CINCs with rapid and responsive aerospace power. These force packages, together with their support and C2 elements, are tailored to meet specific needs across the spectrum of response options and will deploy within an ASETF as aerospace expeditionary

wings (AEWs), groups (AEGs), or squadrons (AESs). *An AEF, by itself, is not a deployable or employable entity* (emphasis in original). (AFDD 2 2000, 38)

*AFDD 2: Organization and Employment  
of Aerospace Power*

The first quotation above is from General Jumper's description of the GSTF, and the second is from AFDD 2: *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*. Deployment under the AEF concept is core to the GSTF construct. The AEF concept addresses three important considerations associated with the organization and employment of air power. First, airpower force packages are tailored for their specific task. Second, these force packages include support organizations. And third, they include command and control elements. At first look, this approach is not terribly different from traditional deployment models. However, when one considers communications offered via space and long-range systems, and the advent of persistent aerial refueling capabilities, and the short notice responsiveness of air forces, he understands the potential appeal of the GSTF to Joint Force Commanders. In other words, the AEF and GSTF concepts allow the massing of firepower and effects without the sizeable footprint associated with military deployments, regardless of the service.

However, understanding that the GSTF will be tailored and task organized to the specific mission, and that this task organization will likely include joint participants, this thesis still needs a baseline force through which it can conduct an analyses in future chapters. In Fall, 2002, Major General David Deptula, Air Combat Command's leading proponent for the GSTF, presented, "Global Strike Task Force: A Joint Leading Edge Power Projection Concept for 21st Century Warfare." In this briefing, he outlined a



notional GSTF force that could be applied against several forcible entry scenarios (Deptula 2002, 33-46). As presented in table 1, the GSTF's effectiveness is optimized with F/A-22 participation.

Table 1. GSTF Construct

<b>Platform</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Role</b>
F/A-22	72	Multirole: Strike, SEAD, Air Superiority, Counterair
B-2	3-20	CONUS & Forward Based - Tasked as Required
Legacy Forces	As Req'd	Includes bombers, fighters, attack aircraft
C4ISR	3-12	AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, U-2, EC-130
UAV	10-20	Unmanned C4ISR
KC-135, KC-10	6-12	Aerial Refueling

*Source:* Deptula, David A. "Global Strike Task Force: A Joint Leading Edge Power Projection Concept for 21st Century Warfare" (Langley AFB, VA, Air Combat Command, February 2002), 33-46.

As of March 2003, the final size of the USAF F/A-22 fleet is still unknown (Hebert 2003, 1). As a baseline for analysis, this thesis will use the force mix presented by Major General Deptula and illustrated in table 1.

#### Enter the Stryker Brigade: The Army Perspective

##### Stryker Brigade Combat Team Construct and Capabilities

Sources available to define SBCT construct and capabilities are significant and consistent across US Army sources. Sources especially valuable to this thesis include the Center for Army Lessons Learned website that includes links to SBCT information, doctrine, and briefings. As figure 1 illustrates, the SBCT is a self-contained, combined arms team, including the following components (FM 3-21.31 2001, 1-11--1-32):

1. An Infantry Battalion as the primary maneuver force
2. A RSTA Squadron
3. A Field Artillery Battalion
4. An Anti-Tank Company
5. An Engineer Company
6. A Signal Company
7. A Military Intelligence (MI) Company
8. A Brigade Support Battalion for logistical support
9. A Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company
10. The SBCT Commander and a Complete Brigade-level Staff




Figure 1. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team. *Source:* FM 3-21.31 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 1-12.

Consistent with the SBCT's description as a "transitional force," capabilities associated with these components generally reflect traditional Army roles alongside capabilities associated with the Objective Force (FM 3-21.31 2001, 1-1):

1. Combined arms assault in the close fight
2. Mobility
3. Reach-back
4. Enhanced situational understanding
5. Lethality
6. Force protection and survivability
7. Force effectiveness
8. Joint, multinational, or interagency operability
9. Full-spectrum flexibility and augmentation.

Detailed explanations of SBCT components and capabilities follow in subsequent chapters. At this point, two trends are important to note. First, nearly all SBCT descriptions specify options to tailor the force to specific missions. Second, the SBCT possesses capabilities that could apply to a forcible entry mission.

#### Stryker Brigade Combat Team Doctrine

True to the efforts to develop and field the SBCT on an accelerated schedule, TRADOC, in conjunction with specialized proponents, produced and continues to produce a myriad of doctrine and tactics, TTP for the SBCT and its sub-components. Two key trends prevail. First, the Army contends that the SBCT is "not a forced entry capability, it's an early entry capability" (Media Roundtable 2002, 13). Second, even though nearly all these documents discuss the SBCT's role in the joint environment, the documents stress the

SBCT's role as an independent organization. For example, FM 3-21.31: *(Coordinating Draft) The Interim Brigade Combat Team* specifies that the SBCT "expect[s] to always operate under ARFOR command" (FM 3-21.31 2001, 1-6). This expectation aside, this aggressive approach to doctrine development is valuable to this thesis' analyses, and outline the capabilities associated with the SBCT components. The following documents are especially significant:

1. FM 3-20.971: *(Final Draft) Reconnaissance Troop*
2. FM 3-20.96: *(Final Draft) Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)*
3. FM 3-20.98: *(Final Draft) Reconnaissance Platoon*
4. FM 3-09.41: *(Coordinating Draft) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fires and Effect of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Operations*
5. FM 3-21.9: *IBCT Infantry Platoon and Squad*
6. FM 3-21.21: *The IBCT Infantry Battalion*
7. FM 3-21.11: *(Coordinating Draft) The SBCT Infantry Company*
8. FM 3-20.151: *(Coordinating Draft) Mobile Gun System (MGS) Platoon*
9. FM 3-21.31: *(Coordinating Draft) The Interim Brigade Combat Team.*

#### Field Manual 3-0: *Operations*

Forcible entry operations are complex and always joint. (FM 3-0 2001, 3-17).

#### FM 3-0: *Operations*

This quotation from the Army's core operational doctrine, FM 3-0: *Operations*, illustrates how the Army values joint participation in forcible entry operations. Consistent with its joint counterpart, FM 3-0 recognizes three types of forcible entry operations: air

assault, parachute assault, and amphibious assault (FM 3-0 2001, 3-17). However, FM 3-0's tone adds an additional twist to the "seize and hold" requirements. FM 3-0 specifies that the initial assault force will seize the lodgment, "while the JFC rapidly deploys additional combat power and sustainment by air and sea" (FM 3-0 2001, 3-16). Presumably, this additional combat power will be the component that holds and expands the lodgment. This separation of the two forcible entry requirements leads one to conclude that two different types of forces will complete the forcible entry mission. As such, the SBCT would be part of the follow-on force, not the assault force.

Additionally, and consistent again with JP 3-18, FM 3-0 places little credibility in the role of airpower beyond a supporting role. By commenting that "Navy and Air Force elements deliver precision strikes to support the force" there is a core presumption in FM 3-0 that airpower can do little to seize the objective (FM 3-0 2001, 3-17).

#### Emerging Operational Thought

War colleges teach two primary forms of warfare--attrition and annihilation. The Gulf War demonstrated another--control through the application of parallel war. The strategies of annihilation and attrition rely on sequential, individual target destruction as the ultimate method of success and measure of progress--generally measured in terms of forces applied, or input. Using effects-based operations, the determinant of success is effective control of systems that the enemy relies upon to exert influence--output. Changing the way we think about the application of force may produce a more effective use of force. (Deptula 2001, 18)

Brigadier General David Deptula, "Effects-Based Operations:  
Change In the Nature of War"

In 2001, then Brigadier General David Deptula made his case for a new approach to campaign planning. He termed this approach, "Effects Based Operations" (EBO). In short, he recognized the limitations placed upon friendly initiative during the period through

which friendly forces are massed and built-up. Under “annihilation and attrition” strategies, the US relies massed forces gained through long-term access to be successful, and this may not always be the case. As an alternative, EBO ‘Focus[es] on influence (the end of strategy) rather than on presence (one traditional means to achieve it), [and] enables us to consider different and perhaps more effective ways to accomplish the same goal with fewer resources” (Deptula 2001, 18-19).

Colonel Edward C. Mann III, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Endersby, and Thomas Searle, in their book, *Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations*, offer a succinct definition of EBO:

Overall, the premise of EBO is to use both lethal (e.g., target destruction) and non-lethal (e.g., information operations) means at the tactical level to produce predetermined direct (first order) and indirect (second and third order) effects at the operational and strategic levels of employment. The net result of this precise application of military resources is to generate effects that will ripple and cascade throughout the system over time, thereby circumscribing options available to opponents and increasing those available to friendly forces. Effects should not be an afterthought of the targeting process or the sole domain of assessors attempting to determine if a target was destroyed. Rather effects should be the integral linchpin that binds together the planning, execution, and assessment of all military actions and the actions of other agencies as well. (Mann *et al* 2002, 26-27)

Forcible entry operations in the presence of enemy anti-access strategies seem to be just the scenario that Deptula, and Mann *et al* would advocate as ideal for effects-based campaign planning. Forcible entry, by its very nature, represents a scenario in which the US lacks the ability to mass forces in a traditional sense. In order to allow follow-on forces to be received, staged, and integrated into the larger operation, a coherent, powerful, albeit lean forcible entry force would be necessary. The objective of this lean force would be to create paralysis of sufficient duration and intensity at the lodgment to allow these activities to be

completed. With this objective in mind, this thesis will apply an EBO mindset to its analysis.

### Summary

In addition to joint and Service doctrine, this thesis incorporates thought and emerging thought on the anti-access challenge and forcible entry operations from academic and think-tank organizations as well as public documents like the *QDR*. Upcoming chapters will address the methodologies applied by this thesis, the core analyses, and final conclusions.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

Joint warfare is team warfare. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to an adversary, while they rapidly and efficiently find and engage those adversary weak points and vulnerabilities that assure mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. (JP 1 2000, i)

*JP 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

This quotation from Joint Publication (JP) 1: *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* describes a perspective important to this study. The distinction that it makes reference the use of all forces is critical. The integration of the SBCT and the GSTF may not be applicable to all forcible entry situations. Nonetheless, if possible, such integration should be made available to the JFC, if consistent with his scheme of maneuver and the operation's desired effects. Since the most responsive mode to insert the SBCT is most likely air, GSTF and SBCT integration will necessarily involve seizing and securing an airfield. As such, this study's research will examine the possibilities of integration via a descriptive methodology, and provide a case study to illustrate how such integration may be useful to the JFC.

#### A Descriptive Methodology

As discussed in chapter 1, this study's examination of GSTF and SBCT integration focuses upon two primary areas: desired effects and supporting doctrine. In order to provide the necessary focus, this thesis concentrates upon the possibilities of such integration in the



broadest sense, and omits many of the details that could prove challenging to this integration. Such details constitute items for further study:

1. Integrated forces C2
2. Joint communications and operational terminology
3. Airlift configurations and alert statuses
4. Habitual joint relationships that facilitate force integration
5. Aligning deployment and training cycles between the Services
6. Air traffic control and landing zone management.

#### The Effects-Conditions-Capabilities Relationship

As mentioned in chapter 2, the anti-access threat is a significant asymmetric challenge to the US, and forcible entry operations represent but one method to counter this threat. The forcible entry mission is unique not necessarily in the effects or capabilities employed, but in the short time period and small geographic area in which they need to be achieved. Understanding this distinction, this thesis will construct a list of desired capabilities that would apply to a generic forcible entry scenario, determine the gaps in GSTF coverage of these capabilities, and determine if the SBCT can suitably address these tasks. Construction of this list begins with the acknowledgement that forcible entry missions comprise two primary effects: seize and hold the lodgment (JP 3-18 2001, I-1). JP 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, further describes eight conditions that “cripple the enemy’s ability to decisively react to, or interfere with, the forcible entry operation” (JP 3-18 2001, III-1). These conditions include surprise, air superiority, control of the space environment, control of the sea, lodgment isolation, ground force neutralization, environmental management, and psychological and civil-military control (JP

3-18 2001, III-1). In addition, this thesis considers conditions specific to the contemporary operating environment as outlined in the 2001 *QDR* and recent studies provided by RAND. These include effective command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and the ability to mass firepower on a timeline to be beneficial to the JFC's plan of operations.




Figure 2. The Effect-Condition-Capability-Component Relationship

Once the conditions for success are identified, a list of capabilities that results in these conditions can be derived. For example, the “air superiority” condition identified above may rely upon Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and counterair capabilities for success. With this list of capabilities, this thesis will determine if either the GSTF or the

SBCT (or both) possess applicable capabilities. Figure 2 demonstrates this effects-conditions-capabilities-component relationship.

With unlimited time and resources, both USAF and US Army organizations are capable of providing the effects on an individual basis, but the short intense nature of forcible entry operations may identify a single component, or an integrated force as the preferred provider. The criteria to determine the preferred provider focus upon ability to achieve the effect soonest, and ability to sustain the effect until follow-on operations commence. Evaluation sources include long-time doctrinal capabilities and timelines, anticipated force capabilities, as well as results from recent “transformational” exercises such as MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002.

At its conclusion, this portion of the study answers three questions:

1. What are the capabilities applicable to contemporary forcible entry scenario?
2. Which type of force is the optimal provider of the desired effect?
3. Can an integrated force achieve these effects with greater success?

Evaluating the effectiveness of an integrated force is critical to this study. As JP 1 mentions, “Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available” (JP 1 2000, I-3). If integration offers little additional effectiveness, then its pursuit is not worthwhile.

#### USAF, Army, and Joint Doctrine

Since both GSTF and SBCT are relatively new concepts, doctrine specific to their integration in a forcible entry scenario is not likely. Nonetheless, each Service’s concept has sufficient doctrine and supporting discussion reference joint and integrated operations to allow for some judgment and extrapolation. This thesis will analyze the status of joint

and individual service doctrine on inter-service integration in the broadest sense, and then analyze both GSTF and SBCT doctrine and discussion to determine the degree and level for which the Services planned for joint and integrated operations. At this portion's conclusion, the following questions will have answers:

1. Do joint, USAF, and Army doctrine exist to support inter-service integration?
2. Do GSTF doctrine and concept development support integrated operations?
3. Do SBCT doctrine and concept development support integrated operations?

#### Case Study Methodology

After completing its core analyses, this thesis presents a case study to illustrate further its arguments. Case study methodology offers the researcher two venues. First, it provides a base-line case against which to test a concept. Second, it offers an illustrative example for future use, should the initial analyses, described above, reveal that the JFC can integrate the two concepts. The base-line case study for this project will be a post-Saddam Middle East scenario.<sup>1</sup>

In Iraq, neither Saddam Hussein nor his internal security infrastructures are in power. Subsequent to these departures, the Iraqi National Congress has only limited success in maintaining order. Iraq experiences a low-grade civil war, and is in danger of fragmentation. With widespread civil unrest present in Iraq, Iran sees an opportunity to fill the regional power vacuum. Openly supporting Shiite rebels in Southern Iraq, Iran initiates a large military build-up, and positions the bulk of its military forces near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti

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<sup>1</sup>This scenario is a modification of the case study offered in Maj Gen David Deptula's 2002 presentation, "Global Strike Task Force: A Joint Leading Edge Power Projection Concept for 21st Century Warfare." Maj Gen Deptula is the Director of the Air Combat Command

border. The Gulf Cooperation Council condemns this action and tensions rise in theater. Following annual military exercises, Iran fails to reposition its forces in garrison, and begin an invasion into Southern Iraq and blocks the Straits of Hormuz. The President and Secretary of Defense, decide to execute an immediate forcible entry operation into Iran. The forcible entry objective is a heavily defended airfield near Bushehr, a town on the Persian Gulf coast, in the Southwest corner of Iran with good road networks toward enemy forces moving into Iraq (figure 3).



Figure 3. Map of Iran. *Source:* Lonely Planet (2002).

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Plans and Programs Division at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. He is Air Combat Command's primary proponent for the GSTF.

The defenses around this airfield consist of sophisticated air defenses, to include modern radar sites, “double-digit” surface to air missiles, such as the SA-20, and tactical SAMs such as the SA-6. The Integrated Air Defense System is largely decentralized and its operators demonstrate a high degree of initiative. Also of concern are heavy ground forces moving into Iraq and threatening Kuwait, as well as an interceptor air base near Choga Zambil that houses credible platforms such as the F-14 “Tomcat.” An additional objective is the military forces near Bandar-e Abbas that blockade the Straits of Hormuz.

Associated with this situation are assumptions that may not be applicable in reality, but exist to facilitate the anti-access scenario:

1. Insufficient military forces exist in theater to accomplish the forcible entry mission. Continental United States based forces are the primary source of military power.
2. The US is initially unable to operate from bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq.
3. The US elects to exercise military options, due to failure or diplomatic and economic activities.
4. Iranian military capabilities are as formidable as described above.

These assumptions facilitate the scenario only, and additionally, serve to simplify the analysis. In reality, one expects that some or all of these assumptions may be invalid. Nonetheless, these limitations do not compromise the case study’s purposes for this thesis.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses of this Thesis’ Methodologies

These descriptive and case-study methodologies described above possesses both strengths and weaknesses. The approach this particular descriptive methodology applies is

similar to what Major General David Deptula describes as EBO (Deptula 2001, 11).

Strengths of this approach include devising joint organizations that achieve the same effect without the overwhelming footprint associated with traditional “attrition and annihilation” warfare (Deptula 2001, 18). It is unlikely that the force mix proposed by this methodology will include an entire SBCT. Consequently, the chances of deploying a credible land component on a shorter timeline are increased, thereby improving the chances for an integrated force. However, this approach has its drawbacks. First, as the following quotation by Army General William F. Kernan, Commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) attests, key personalities in the joint community have not yet fully embraced EBO as a planning tool: “I believe that effects-based operations will be the doctrinal concept--the future joint warfighting concept--that our nation will employ. But it ain’t ready yet” (Correll 2002a, 28). Consequently, they may not be eager to apply EBO planning principles, thereby eliminating forcible entry as a realistic operational alternative because the perceived force requirement is too large.

Second, since EBO outcomes are more difficult to quantify, data supporting these assertions will be harder to measure (Deptula 2001, 18). Moreover, as David Collins, a senior USJFCOM military analyst, observes, there exists no doctrinal baseline to allow for assessment of EBO’s success. USJFCOM acknowledges this shortcoming, and continues to pursue doctrinal development to support Effects Assessment (Collins 2003, 15-17). Closely related to this shortcoming is that much of the data related to “transformational” exercises such as MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 remains classified. Indeed, specifics beyond “successful” have been rare. Nonetheless, the approach offered here is suitable for analysis at the operational level of war, and meets this thesis’ needs.

## Summary

This thesis applies two research methodologies in a sequential manner. The first methodology is a descriptive analysis consisting of two primary branches. The first branch focuses upon effects desired in the forcible entry scenario, and the second branch focuses on available doctrine at the Service and joint levels. The most critical branch is the effects-desired branch. This thesis' methodology identified criteria that apply during this analysis. The effects offered through an integrated force need to be assessed against the effects offered through a single-service, or simple joint operation.

The second methodology applies a case study, based upon fictional events in the Middle East, as a means to test an integrated force concept as well as illustrate how an integrated force would operate.

Chapter 4 describes the outcomes of these methodologies, and chapter 5 outlines the analytical conclusions and offers recommendations.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis' analyses apply descriptive methodologies to two considerations applicable to nearly all integrated operations. First, this thesis will evaluate if there is value added to the GSTF mission through the integration of SBCT components. Second, having established that this integration provides additional strength to the forcible entry mission, this thesis will examine whether joint and Service doctrine are sufficient to support such operations. Applying a case study based upon fictional events in the Persian Gulf region, this thesis will then illustrate how such integration may be accomplished. This thesis' goal is to demonstrate the current capability to integrate beyond simple joint operations for a specific mission and to present the advantages of such an approach to operational planning.

#### Effects, Conditions, and Capabilities Applicable to the Forcible Entry Mission

JP 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations* identifies two broad effects required for success in the forcible entry mission. First, the lodgment must be seized, and second, it must be held (JP 3-18 2001, I-1). The ultimate purposes of any forcible entry operation are to establish conditions for the safe introduction of follow-on forces, and to prepare the battlespace for subsequent military operations.

While certainly accurate, these effects require additional detail, even at the operational level of war. JP 3-18 identifies eight "conditions for forcible entry success" (JP 3-18 2001, III-1). These conditions include surprise, air superiority, control of the space

environment, control of the sea, lodgment isolation, enemy force neutralization, environmental management, and psychological and civil-military operations integration (JP 3-18 2001, III-1). These conditions support both the “seize” and “hold” effects, and represent enduring qualities associated with successful forcible entry operations. The introduction of new organizations, tactics, or technologies is unlikely to alter these conditions. Consistent with the delimitations specified in chapter 1 of this thesis, analyses presented here will address neither control of the space environment nor control of the sea.

The challenge to the JFC is to derive a force with capabilities that induce the desired conditions, thereby producing the effects identified as requisite to success. As discussed earlier, each potential forcible entry scenario and their associated enemy forces possess unique challenges that could require different approaches to the forces’ task organizations. For this thesis, analyses center on a worst-case scenario with a formidable enemy, such as presented in chapter 3’s case study.

Given this scenario, the capabilities required for success include those outlined in table 2. This list represents a distillation of joint and service doctrine, and recent thought from reputable think-tank research, as discussed in chapter 2. They suggest both enduring missions and new requirements associated with the contemporary operating environment. The list may not be all-inclusive, but do represent a broad baseline associated with the chapter 3 case study as well as most forcible entry scenarios.

Table 2. Desired Effects, Conditions, and Capabilities in the Forcible Entry Mission

Effect	Condition	Capability
Seize & Hold	Surprise	Information Operations
		Strategic Attack
	Air Superiority	Counterair
		SEAD
		Air Defense
	Enemy Force Neutralization at the Lodgement	Anti-Armor
		Anti-Personnel
	Lodgment Isolation	Interdiction
		Strategic Attack
		Missile Defense
	Environmental Management	Anti-Mine (Sea)
		Obstacle/Land Mine Removal
		Locate/Destroy Enemy WMD Capability
	C4ISR	HUMINT Collection
		Signals Collection
		Imagery Collection
		Air Picture
		Ground Picture
		Communications Jamming
		Radar Jamming
		Airspace Management
	PSYOP/CMO	Command & Control
		PSYOP
		CMO

With ongoing efforts toward transformation, the organizations, technologies, and tactics available to the JFC are different from previous times. Indeed, both GSTF and SBCT represent changes in organization, technologies, and tactics. Given the assumption that the SBCT will integrate into the GSTF, as noted in chapter 1, the next step is to overlay the GSTF capabilities, as outlined in chapter 2 with the capabilities required for a successful forcible entry scenario as outlined in table 2. Table 3 illustrates this analysis' results. Presented in this table are the desired capabilities, and the most likely GSTF platform(s) that would be the capability provider.

Consistent with its own concept, GSTF can address the lion's share of required capabilities for a forcible entry operation. Notable gaps exist in the air defense, missile

defense, obstacle and land mine removal, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, and civil-military operations capabilities. These capabilities may represent areas through which the JFC can integrate a SBCT.

Table 3. Conditions, Capabilities, and Force Providers in a Forcible Entry Mission

Condition	Capability	GSTF Provider	SBCT Provider
Surprise	Information Operations	EC-130	Sig, MI
	Strategic Attack	F/A-22, F-117, B-2	
Air Superiority	Counterair	F/A-22, F-15, F-16	FA
	SEAD	F/A-22, F-16	FA, IN
	Air Defense		Div/Corps Aug
Enemy Force Neutralization at the Lodgement	Anti-Armor	F/A-22, F-16, A-10	AT
	Anti-Personnel	AC-130	IN, FA
Lodgment Isolation	Interdiction	F/A-22, F-16	FA
	Strategic Attack	F/A-22, B-1, B-2, B-52	
	Missile Defense		Div/Corps Aug
Environmental Management	Anti-Mine (Sea)	B-52	
	Obstacle/Land Mine Removal		EN, FA
	Destroy Enemy WMD Capability	F/A-22, B-1, B-2, B-52	RSTA
C4ISR	HUMINT Collection		MI
	Signals Collection	UAV, RJ	UAV, MI
	Imagery Collection	UAV, U-2	UAV, MI
	Air Picture	AWACS	
	Ground Picture	JSTARS, UAV	RSTA, JSTARS, UAV, MI
	Communications Jamming	EC-130	
	Radar Jamming	EA-6B	
	Airspace Management	AWACS, JAOC	
	Command & Control	AWACS, JAOC	HHC, Sig
	PSYOP	EC-130, Leaflets	Div/Corps Aug
PSYOP/CMO	CMO		Div/Corps Aug

Chapter 2 of this thesis outlines the capabilities inherent to the SBCT. True to its full-spectrum claim, and in spite of official exemptions, the SBCT possesses capabilities that could be applied to fill GSTF gaps in a forcible entry scenario, but as table 3 also illustrates, it cannot fill all gaps without augmentation from division or corps.

#### Constructing the Land Component

Important to the analysis at this point is the understanding that an entire SBCT will not likely be involved in the forcible entry operation. Only those portions of the SBCT that

add capabilities to the forcible entry mission would be involved. However, incumbent with this involvement is deploying these SBCT components with enough capabilities to be both effective and survivable. Table 4 describes a baseline set of SBCT components that would be involved in this analysis.

Table 4. SBCT Forcible Entry Slice

<b>SBCT Unit</b>	<b>Primary Capability</b>	<b>Personnel</b>	<b>IAV</b>	<b>STONS</b>
1 X Infantry Btn	Anti-Personnel	750	54	1320
Field Artillery Btn	Close Interdiction	288	22	583
2 X Anti-Tank Platoon	Anti-Armor	34	8	220
Engineer Company	Anti-Obstacle/Mobility	128	22	517
RSTA Squadron	Target Acquisition	499	54	1260
Signal Company Transmission Plt	Communication Support	45	5	160
Military Police Company	Force Protection	144	0	100
<b>Total</b>		<b>1888</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>4996</b>

This baseline land component represents an austere force indeed. The intent in this case is to simply mass firepower upon the objective. Notable absences include combat health support, military police, and key logistical enablers like supply, maintenance, and field services.

#### Mass and the Challenge of Getting to the Fight

To meet emerging strategic challenges, the US must find an approach to power projection that is far less sensitive to time and access assumptions. Put another way, the US must increase its global responsiveness while decreasing theater “footprint” and thus its dependence upon theater access for the projection of military power. (Hicks and Associates 2001, 8)

Hicks and Associates, *Rethinking US Combat Airpower Modernization*

[The Global Strike Task Force] concept is to mass *desired effects* from outside the theater...before massing theater forces (emphasis in original). (Deptula 2002, 28).

Major General David Deptula, "Global Strike Task Force:  
A Joint Leading Edge Power Projection Concept  
for 21st Century Warfare"

These two quotes illustrate what may be the greatest challenge to integrating a SBCT into GSTF forcible entry mission: constructing a land component light enough to be immediately deployable, yet strong enough to affect the battlespace. This challenge typically results in an analysis of airlift availability.

Airlift availability is a significant consideration inherent in the SBCT goal to deploy within ninety-six hours. As noted in chapter 1 of this thesis, the military airlift shortfall has been a long time concern of defense planners and academicians alike. In order to make a unique contribution to transformational thought, this thesis specifically delimited airlift availability as a consideration. That said, there remains an additional consideration in the SBCT strategic mobility analysis beyond simple availability of airlift tails. This consideration relates to the SBCT's strategic responsiveness. RAND, in its 2003 study, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options*, defines strategic responsiveness "as the ability of a force to deploy decisive combat power on a timetable that supports the objectives of US leaders" (Vick, *et al* 2003, 10). For this thesis' purpose, the number of aircraft tails available is not a primary consideration, but the ability to move them through the forcible entry objective is a significant consideration. Two terms that apply in this case are throughput and closure.

RAND, in the same study cited above, defined throughput as "the number of aircraft that can land, unload, be serviced, and take off per hour" (Vick, *et al* 2003, 21). Since the

primary means to deploy the SBCT in a forcible entry scenario would most likely be airlift, and the primary airlift method is airland delivery, throughput is a key factor in assessing the SBCT's strategic responsiveness. Conditions both within and outside the JFC's control may limit throughput. The availability of support personnel, airfield size and condition, and force protection are examples of such conditions.

The second key factor in determining a ground force's strategic responsiveness is closure time. The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines closure with the following text:

Closure is the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (JP 1-02 2001, 81)

Usually measured in hours, closure represents the bottom line assessment of strategic responsiveness. As related to GSTF operations, closure time represents the period during which ground forces will be most vulnerable. As such, GSTF priority will necessarily emphasize security and survivability of ground forces, commonly described as the "close fight." Consequently, GSTF assets may not be available for more strategic operations such as destruction of the enemy's long-range missile capabilities and command networks.

#### Airlifting the SBCT Slice: Analytical Assumptions

As previously discussed, the airlift analysis applicable to this thesis focuses upon throughput and closure. In short, this thesis will assess the potential ability to mass ground-based combat power to facilitate the ultimate effects of seize and hold. Consequently, the following assumptions apply to the analysis:

1. The entire projected USAF C-17 and C-130 fleets are available for this operation. In 2007, the USAF will likely possess 180 C-17s (Global Security.Org 2003, 1) and approximately 530 C-130s (Daniels 1998, 2).
2. Both the C-17 and C-130 will transport up to ninety passengers (AFPAM 10-1403 1998, 13).
3. The C-17's allowable cabin load is forty-five short tons (AFPAM 10-1403 1998, 13).
4. The C-130's allowable cabin load is twenty short tons (AFPAM 10-1403 1998, 13).
5. The SBCT package configurations allow for perfect loading and cargo movement. Specifically, the entire allowable cabin load, whether in the form of personnel or cargo is used for each airlift sortie.
6. Engine Running Offload (ERO) will be the offload method used to remove the vehicles and other cargo. An ERO is an aerial delivery procedure through which cargo and passengers depart a parked aircraft while the aircraft engines are running. This procedure expedites the offload process by eliminating the time to shutdown and restart engines, and to prepare the aircraft for departure.
7. After completing the ERO, the aircraft immediately taxis to depart the airfield. No supporting cargo aircraft will experience maintenance problems that prevent a timely departure. No aircraft will be refueled, nor receive other services, at the objective. There will be no outbound personnel (casualties or non-combatant evacuees, for example) or cargo from the objective.



8. EROs involving pure passenger delivery will average thirty minutes, measured from aircraft touchdown through takeoff.

9. EROs involving cargo will average sixty minutes, measured from aircraft touchdown through takeoff.

10. Movement planning is thorough enough to allow for a continuous flow of cargo aircraft, regardless of designation, twenty-four hours a day.

11. The objective's runway is strong enough to allow a fully loaded aircraft to land without damaging the runway, thereby interrupting airlift flow.

These assumptions describe a very aggressive airlift plan, and one can argue that many are beyond the capabilities of the US by 2007. Nonetheless, they allow for a baseline analysis at the operational level. This thesis acknowledges that any timeline suggested by this analysis will likely extend as additional requirements surface.

#### Airlifting the SBCT Slice: The Impact of Maximum on Ground

Maximum on Ground (MOG) is a measure of the objective's ability to support loading and unloading operations. MOG represents a significant, but fluid component to airlift analysis. There are two types of MOG. The first is physical, or surveyed MOG. Physical MOG represents the airfield's ability to support aircraft as restrained by the actual size of the parking ramp and other associated airport facilities. Logically, the type of aircraft (wide versus narrow body, large frame versus jumbo, and others) involved plays into this analysis. Usually, the number of the various types of aircraft indicates physical MOG. For example, an airport's physical MOG may be ten C-130s, but only six C-17s, due to the C-17's larger size. The ratio between large frame and small frame aircraft is not static

in this analysis, as other considerations, such as taxiway width, wingtip clearances and the like will be different for each field.

Over the course of a forcible entry operation, physical MOG may change. Combat damage, enemy attempts to render portions or the entire field unusable, and force protection concerns, among other considerations will affect an airfield's physical MOG.

The second type of MOG is working MOG. Working MOG is typically a more reliable analytical tool. Working MOG represents the objective's ability to not only park, but also service and load or unload the aircraft. The number of supporting personnel available to assist the airlift operation typically restrains an airfield's working MOG. For example, a field with a physical MOG of ten planes may have only one load team, thereby limiting the field's working MOG to one aircraft.

Another consideration affecting working MOG is the type of cargo involved. Pure passenger missions, whereby the passengers can unload themselves by simply walking off the aircraft will allow for a greater working MOG. Similar results are achieved if wheeled or motorized vehicles can simply roll or drive off the aircraft. Alternatively, if cargo configurations prevent autonomous unloading, more support in the form of load teams is required.

For analytical ease, this analysis assumes that working MOG and physical MOG are the same. In the chapter 3 case study, the airfield near Bushehr, the forcible entry objective, will have a working MOG of six mobility aircraft.

With the previous assumptions and impact of MOG understood, a baseline set of values can be calculated.

Airlifting the SBCT Slice:  
Calculating Closure Time

The first step in calculating closure time is to determine the number of aircraft required to move the SBCT slice to its destination. This thesis applies the following formulae:

$$(\text{Total Cargo} \times .95) / \text{allowable cabin load} = \text{Number of aircraft required for cargo}$$

$$(\text{Total Passengers} \times .95) / 90 = \text{Number of aircraft required for passengers}$$

Consequently, for the SBCT slice described above,

$$(4996 \text{ STONS} \times .95) / 45 \text{ STONS} = 105.5 \text{ C-17s required for cargo movement,}$$

or

$$(4996 \text{ STONS} \times .95) / 20 \text{ STONS} = 237.3 \text{ C-130s required for cargo movement,}$$

and

$$(1888 \text{ personnel} \times .95) / 90 \text{ personnel} = 19.9 \text{ C-17s or C-130s required for personnel movement.}$$

Acknowledging that these values fall below the projected airlift fleet, this analysis will base subsequent calculations upon a required airlift force of 106 C-17s and 20 C-17s or C-130s.

To calculate throughput, the following formula applies:

$$\text{MOG} / (\text{ERO Time}) = \text{Throughput}$$

As such for an airfield with a MOG of 6 aircraft,

$$6 / (.5 \text{ hour}) = 12 \text{ aircraft per hour for passengers}$$

and

$$6 / (1 \text{ hour}) = 6 \text{ aircraft per hour for cargo}$$

Finally, to calculate total closure time, the following formula applies,

$$\frac{[(\text{Passenger Aircraft Required})/(\text{Passenger Throughput})] + [(\text{Cargo Aircraft Required})/(\text{Cargo Throughput})]}{\text{Total Closure Time}}$$

Continuing with the previous example an airfield with a MOG of six aircraft,

$$(20 \text{ passenger aircraft}/12 \text{ aircraft per hour}) + (106 \text{ cargo aircraft}/6 \text{ aircraft per hour}) \\ = 1.67 \text{ hours} + 17.67 \text{ hours} = \underline{19.34 \text{ hours total closure time}}$$

As this series of calculations suggest, closure time is highly dependent upon offload time, and MOG at the destination. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of MOG and offload time on these calculations. It shows the impact on the SBCT slice's closure of average unload times (passengers and cargo) from thirty minutes through two hours, and MOGs of one through twelve. As an airfield's MOG increases, the impact of offload times becomes less significant. Alternatively, at airfields with low MOG values, offload time is the preponderant factor. As this figure illustrates, this relationship is not linear. Bottom line, even with an aggressive delivery plan, the chance of closure in less than twelve hours is slim.

This analysis' fundamental point is that even with an austere SBCT force as applied to the case study in this analysis, closure time the time required to mass sufficient forces will be a significant consideration in JFC's overall scheme of operations, and this consideration extends beyond simple airlift availability. It may drive planners to select an objective with large MOG values, if such a choice exists, especially as the land component slice increases in value. Alternatively, if no such option exists, it may cause planners to delay the introduction of heavy land forces until the objective is more secure.




Figure 4. SBCT Slice Closure Time as Impacted by MOG and Offload Time

Ideally, presented with these demanding tasks, joint planners would turn to doctrine to guide their efforts. As such, this thesis will examine the suitability of joint and service doctrine for integrated operations in general, and forcible entry operations, in particular.

#### Joint Doctrine Adequacy

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. That concept is based on joint doctrine and its associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. It provides a common framework and approach to warfighting from which game plans can be developed—and successfully executed through the universal practice of joint doctrine. (*Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer* 1997, inside cover)

General John Shalikashvili, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili's words emphasize the importance of common planning and execution practices in fighting as a

joint or integrated team. Compressed timelines and compact geographies associated with forcible entry operations make this perspective especially important. To this end, the adequacy of joint doctrine is mixed. For the most part, joint doctrine related to the specific competencies that could apply to a forcible entry scenario is complete, offers credible tactics, techniques, and procedures, and delineates specific responsibilities between the components. However, the existence of an effective single source document and genuinely integrated perspective in joint forcible entry doctrine is noticeably absent.

JP 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, is the core joint publication for planning and execution of forcible entry operations. No other document in the Joint Library discusses forcible entry operations as a complete campaign in itself, although several other joint documents address the competencies and capabilities applicable to forcible entry operations. Even though the publication retains its status as joint doctrine, it possesses a decidedly ground-centric flavor. It does devote an entire chapter to considerations related to “Integration and or Synchronization,” but offers few techniques for joint force integration aside from army and marine units (JP 3-18 2001, V-1). While JP 3-18 discusses the importance of air superiority, and includes some considerations for joint air operations in its brief planning checklists, the document’s tone suggests that the primary role of the air component is to support the airborne, amphibious, or air assault operation (JP 3-18 2001, III-7). It does not suggest the possibility of using the air component to seize, or isolate an objective, or the possibility of introducing heavy or mechanized Army capabilities, thereby overlooking the capabilities of organizations such as the GSTF and the SBCT. In all, this omission results in a narrow set of possible task organizations available to planners. By identifying airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations as the “three

primary forcible entry options,” the publication leads planners to a traditional, legacy approach to the problem.

Aside from shortcomings described above, equally disappointing is the fact that JP 3-18 lacks thorough discussion about the importance of sequencing specific force types; methods of task organization to avoid duplication between joint forces; and legitimate component concerns associated with the compact geography, compressed timelines, and limited resources associated with forcible entry operations. Additional discussion and TTPs about these and other topics, presented in a consolidated fashion, would serve the publication well in its relevance to JFCs and their staffs. As it stands now, planners need to reference the joint publication associated with the specific capability or issue in question and attempt to apply this doctrine to the anticipated operation.

One such issue is airspace control within the forcible entry objective. JP 3-52: *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*, represents current joint thought on this issue. Although the document does not address airspace control during forcible entry operations in general, it does discuss airspace control during amphibious operations (JP 3-52 1995, IV-2). Similar to the ground-centric perspective evident in JP 3-18, JP 3-52 specifies, “All air operations and airspace control procedures in the Amphibious Operations Area will be under the control of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, or designated Commander, Amphibious Task Force representative, until the amphibious operation is terminated” (JP 3-52 1995, IV-2). This statement implies that the Amphibious Task Force will nearly always be the JFC’s main effort. If planners derive parallels between the amphibious landing force and the ground component in a forcible entry scenario, this perspective could prove counterproductive to the effective use of operational assets. Under

the GSTF concept, it is possible that the air component is the JFC's main effort. Logically then, the GSTF commander would be the airspace control authority. Nonetheless, component-centric doctrinal language in this and other joint publications could be a source of rigid thought and contention between component commanders.

This is not to say that joint doctrine for amphibious operations cannot be valuable to ground component planners in a forcible entry scenario. No joint publications exist to address directly joint landing force operations via aerial delivery. JP 3-17: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations* retains primarily an air mobility perspective, and offers ground commanders few techniques to optimize their task organization to the forcible entry mission. However, as noted in the airspace control discussion, above, JP 3-02: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, in conjunction with its supporting publications, JP 3-02.1T: *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*, and JP 3-02.2: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*, do offer significant parallels worth mentioning. In these publications, one finds detailed discussion to include TTP, and planning standards supporting planners of amphibious operations to include forcible entry situations. Especially worthwhile are the discussions on sequencing landing forces, priority of action upon embarkation, and the integration of air, naval, and landing force components. In many circumstances, planners can substitute cargo aircraft for naval transport and landing vessels, and Army components for the maritime landing force. In these circumstances, planners can gain insight to the challenges of force integration in order to achieve desired effects and avoid fratricide.



### Service Doctrine Deficiency

On the whole, if one agrees that the JP 3-02 series has applications to GSTF and SBCT integration, then joint doctrine fares surprisingly well against its Service counterparts. Chapter 2 discusses trends in this doctrine, but as related to this analysis, a few key trends are evident:

1. Both USAF and US Army published doctrine place little credibility in the ability of airpower to contribute in the seizure of a lodgment. Rather airpower's role clearly is to support the ground force.
2. US Army doctrine does not overtly support the role of a single force that can seize, hold, and expand the lodgment, as could be attributed to the SBCT.
3. US Army doctrine does support the placement of Army C2 elements in airborne C2 platforms, thereby reducing the size of the deployed force (FM 3-0 2001, 3-17).
4. USAF doctrine does not address the forcible entry mission in any coherent and complete manner.

### Summary of Doctrine Analysis

Joint and Service doctrine addressing forcible entry missions retains a decidedly legacy perspective. Regardless of source, doctrine overlooks the role of airpower beyond a supporting role, and US Army doctrine specifically overlooks the possibility of employing forces with the capability to seize, hold, and expand the lodgment. As such, these approaches do not support GSTF or SBCT involvement on neither an individual nor an integrated basis.

As the opening paragraphs in chapter 2 discuss, the question of which comes first, doctrine or capability will be an ongoing issue. Certainly, the GSTF and SBCT if integrated

properly, and in the case of the SBCT, configured properly, and with the right objective, can accomplish the forcible entry mission. It seems that doctrine has not kept pace with Service and joint transformational efforts. The two to five year timeline associated with doctrine development and coordination is a likely explanation for this shortcoming (*Joint Doctrine Development Process* 2002, 6).

#### Case Study Application

In spite of doctrinal shortcomings toward integration, GSTF integration with a ground component offers capabilities to a JFC. First, these stronger ground forces will allow for quicker seizure of the objective. Second, they can hold and prepare the objective for a large-scale deployment of ground forces to include additional SBCTs by sea and air, as well as heavier forces via sealift.

To illustrate this additional capability, this thesis will apply the case study offered in chapter 3. Given the situation in the Persian Gulf region, US goals are as follow:

1. Strategically, assure allies that, regardless of enemy anti-access strategies, the US possesses the capability and will to overcome these strategies and introduce stability to the region
2. Strategically, rapidly establish the conditions for large-scale introduction of follow-on forces as required
3. Operationally, seize and hold the Bushehir Airport for the introduction of follow-on forces
4. Operationally, eliminate the threat posed by Iranian weapons of mass destruction
5. Operationally, neutralize Iranian heavy ground forces threatening Kuwait and Southern Iraq

6. Operationally, neutralize Iranian air defense systems and air-to-air capabilities to gain air superiority

7. Operationally, neutralize Iranian cruise and ballistic missiles that threaten incoming forces and regional allies

8. Operationally, reopen the Straits of Hormuz to allow the resumption of military and commercial shipping into the Persian Gulf.

#### Opening Events--Preparation for Action

The forcible entry operation begins with Predictive Battlespace Awareness actions to determine enemy disposition. GSTF platforms to include Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, Airborne Warning and Control System, RIVET JOINT and UAVs, in conjunction with national space assets collect and disseminate this information to planners, military and political leaders. Additionally, this information, along with an updated target set is passed to airborne strike assets en route to their objectives.

#### Initial GSTF Actions

Upon arrival in theater, eight F-22s establish barrier combat air patrols along the southwest edge of the Persian Gulf. These combat air patrols protect the friendly airborne command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network, and defend against possible enemy F-14 interceptors.

Applying F/A-22 supercruise and stealth capabilities, an additional eight of these aircraft intercept enemy cruise missiles, and initiate deep attacks against critical enemy C2 nodes. During these attacks, the F-22s extend friendly ISR capabilities deep into enemy territory, thereby enabling B-2 daytime attacks against strategic targets and enemy

interceptor aircraft at Choga Zambil. These actions result in a degree of air superiority to allow for offensive actions immediately around Bushehir.

Given this air superiority and the deep ISR picture previously provided by F-22s, legacy bomber aircraft armed with Joint Stand Off Weapons and Joint Direct Attack Munitions attack air defense assets immediately around Bushehir and potential WMD sites deep in Iran. Immediately after these attacks, mobility aircraft begin their flow into Bushehir. A second wave of counterair and ground attack aircraft, to include legacy systems such as the A-10, F-16 CG/CJ, F-15E, and F-15C provide protection to the landing force.

Priority of air operations shifts to the close fight in protection of the landing force and the maintenance of air superiority.

#### Enter the SBCT Slice

En route to their objective, ground commanders receive updated intelligence data and analyses and refine their ground plan as necessary. Upon landing, and attaining sufficient firepower, the SBCT slice begins anti-personnel and anti-armor operations at Bushehir Airport. Ground priority is to clearing airport facilities of enemy resistance, removal of obstacles on or near the airfield, and lodgment isolation. Air defense and close support around Bushehir remains the priority for air operations. At conclusion, a defensive perimeter is established around the airfield, with all enemy forces destroyed. The airfield is secure and ready for reception of follow-on forces.

While ground operations are in progress, legacy bomber and attack aircraft supported by the GSTF ISR network interdict enemy armor movement threatening Kuwait and Southern Iraq. The application of both air and ground assets presents a quandary for the

enemy commander. Should enemy forces disperse as self-protection against airpower, or should they concentrate to deal with the arriving ground forces? This enemy dilemma improves the friendly targeting process. If the enemy chooses to remain dispersed and not move toward Bushehir, the reception of follow-on forces can continue unhampered. If they concentrate in order to defend against the SBCT, GSTF ground support assets will be in the veritable “target-rich environment.” Additional air strikes destroy enemy forces blocking the Straits of Hormuz.

#### Summary

The analysis of GSTF and SBCT integration in the forcible entry mission demonstrates that under the right circumstances, to include the lodgment’s characteristics, integration is not only possible, but also desirable. However, insufficient doctrine and TTPs at the joint and Service levels is evident. This deficiency perpetuates a lack of service component integration, especially during the planning phases of a forcible entry operation. As such, ongoing efforts toward true transformation into what Secretary Rumsfeld calls a “rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint force” will be stymied by tradition service parochialism and efforts to acquire future “transformational” and “objective” weapons systems (Rumsfeld, 2000).

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

Technology itself is not decisive; it is the effective integration of new technology into strategy and doctrine that is revolutionary. Successful militaries analyze and anticipate the effect of evolving technology and effectively combine it with their strategy, doctrine, and tactics. (Svetez 2001, 12)

Thomas Svetez, "Global Strategic Task Force:  
A Strategic Renaissance"

In his 2001 essay, "Global Strategic Task Force: A Strategic Renaissance," Major Thomas Svetez succinctly described the one of greatest challenges associated with the current self-declared Revolution in Military Affairs--matching emerging technologies with sound operational doctrine. As discussed in previous chapters and analyzed in chapter 4, sufficient capabilities exist to integrate the SBCT and GSTF structures in the forcible entry mission. Certainly, this integration may not apply in all circumstances, as there may be limitations beyond JFC control. However, doctrine, legitimate Service concerns, coupled with parochialism limit this integration more than technology.

#### Joint Capabilities

As illustrated in chapter 4, the SBCT adds capabilities that may be desirable to the JFC's plans, depending upon the forcible entry scenario. Most notable are the SBCT's capabilities in the close anti-armor and anti-personnel fight. Additionally, the SBCT's engineer company would serve the JFC well with its anti-obstacle and mobility capabilities. While GSTF platforms such as the F/A-22 possess formidable counterland capabilities,

aside from outright destruction of airfield facilities, it cannot clear these building as effectively as ground forces.

A logical counter-argument to this assertion is that other US Army units, such as the Rangers and the 82d Airborne possess this capability, and have proven their success in Grenada and Panama. However, as RAND and other credible agencies observe, these units would be less effective against heavier enemy forces and can do little to expand the lodgment (Matsumura 2000, 7). AFDD 2-1: *Air Warfare*, reinforces this argument well. Traditional strategies suggest a shock-build combat power-mount counteroffensive linear approach. However, during the first two phases of this strategy, the enemy retains significant initiative. If the JFC can introduce increased firepower and maneuverability coincident with the shock force, he could initially bypass the build combat power phase, and simultaneously expand the initiative made available by the initial shock and prepare the lodgment for additional joint forces (AFDD 2-1 2000, 5-6). If tailored correctly, SBCT components possess this additional capability.

#### Force Tailoring

Tailoring SBCT components to a forcible entry mission represents a formidable challenge. Admittedly, the force outlined in chapter 4 is an austere force, and the argument that the ground component needs more is certainly valid. Nonetheless, chapter 4's analysis does provide some insights on issues regarding SBCT integration.

Effective SBCT integration depends more on the nature of the objective and less on the airlift plan or number of aircraft available. Discussed at length in chapter 4, closure time is highly reactive to the objective's MOG, and less reactive to download times, especially at

objectives with MOGs in excess of six, and especially if the JFC wants to close a credible SBCT slice in less than twenty-four hours.

A close corollary to the above observation counters the perceived requirement to minimize the SBCT slice's size at all costs. Given that MOG is among the greatest considerations in SBCT closure, the JFLCC has some latitude in the slice's size, without prohibitive impact to assembly time. As figure 5 illustrates, with a MOG of six, the JFLCC can increase the SBCT slice to approximately 6,500 short tons, and still assemble his forces in less than a day (assuming a one hour ERO time for equipment and thirty minutes for passengers). This represents a thirty-two percent increase in available tonnage over the force presented in chapter 4.




Figure 5. SBCT Slice Closure Time as a Function of Weight and MOG

However, even though the JFLCC has this latitude, he still needs to be selective as he formulates the ground force. Figure 5 also illustrates that it would take nearly two days



to close an entire SBCT (representing nearly 12,000 short tons). This requirement to be selective has implications with how the Army expects to do business with the SBCT as an organization, especially in structure and personnel career development. Granted, the SBCT's organizational structure already represents a credible departure from the Army's legacy approach. Designed to deploy as a lighter organization, with enough supplies for three days of combat, the SBCT differs from its legacy counterparts in this area alone (FM 3-21.31 2002, 1). One question at this point is whether the SBCT needs three days of supplies in a forcible entry scenario. While it is dangerous to "fight the last war," history suggests that it does not. As such, it would be worthwhile to devise SBCT deployment packages with supplies for one to two days. This approach not only reduces the SBCT's strategic mobility requirement, but also reduces force protection and ground transportation requirements. Consequently, lift allocated to move these personnel and associated equipment can be either reduced or filled with combat forces.

Similar results can be achieved should the SBCT slice reduce its command infrastructure. For example, the SBCT's RSTA Squadron and Field Artillery Battalion each have headquarters sections, representing eighty-five and seventy-two personnel, respectively (FM 3-21.31 2002, 1-14--1-17). These personnel and their supporting equipment would take two cargo aircraft alone. While the value these professionals offer to the Army is not in question, additional gains can be made by not including them in the forcible entry slice. The argument's implication is that SBCT components would need to operate at least semi-autonomously, applying sensor-to-shooter technology, or reliable connectivity to off-site (perhaps airborne) C2 organizations.

Personnel career development is yet another challenge to a possible SBCT forcible entry mission. In the US Army, it is a well-known fact that everyone can ultimately be an infantry soldier. But can they also be a military policeman, or a civil affairs and PSYOP operator?

Again, as chapter 4's analyses suggest, MOG still drives the SBCT's closure time more than weight. As always, the JFC, in conjunction with the JFLCC, determines the required force structure for the mission, and each situation will be different. Nonetheless, marginal improvements in closure time or ground force capabilities are possible by reducing the SBCT's command and organizational infrastructure, suitable to the task on hand.

#### Items for Further Study

One aerial delivery method not addressed in this thesis is airdrop. Officially, the SBCT is not deliverable via airdrop, primarily due to limitations associated with the Stryker Vehicle (McCoy 2001, 12). This thesis accepted this assertion, and focused upon airland operations as the primary delivery method. cursory calculations suggest that the entire SBCT can achieve closure in three to four hours under the right conditions if the entire brigade were air droppable. Alternatively, one could examine a combination of personnel delivery via airdrop and Stryker vehicle delivery via airland as an approach. Admittedly, there are significant implications for both the Army and the Air Force associated with these questions. Nonetheless, if possible, the advantages are clear. Finally, if not possible for the SBCT, the Army should consider airdrop as a delivery method required for the Objective Force.

### Improving Doctrinal Applicability

Chapter 4's analyses additionally identified shortcomings in joint and Service doctrine addressing forcible entry operations. Detailed discussion, to include possible explanations for these deficiencies are also noted in chapter 4. Without repeating the outcome, this thesis has three recommendations for future doctrinal development.

First, JP 3-18: *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, needs additional discussion on command relationships during integrated versus simple joint forcible entry operations. In an integrated operation, issues such as placement of the fire support coordination line are not necessarily applicable; however, clear guidelines on how to provide air-based protection are required. As envisioned by this thesis, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander controls the air portion of the entire battlespace, and is the air defense authority over the lodgment. Likely and legitimate ground component concerns about fratricide, for example, suggest that rules of engagement be specified for both ground and air forces to avoid such problems, especially with a highly contested lodgment. Additionally, even if planners provide effects-based methodologies to its forcible entry plan, the ground component will be vulnerable to attack for a sizeable period of time. As such, the air component would have to provide highly reliable and responsive close air support for an extended period. Understanding this fact, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander would have to construct GSTF forces to reflect greater CAS missions, as it has during previous operations.

Second, joint and Service doctrine addressing airland delivery during combat operations, to include forcible entry, are required. A publication similar in scope and detail to JP 3-02: *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* would serve the joint community

well. The classified Air Force TTP 3-1 series and its unclassified, 3-2 series, provide good information to accomplish the aerial delivery mission, but joint doctrine on sequencing personnel and equipment during combat airland operations, as well as other issues, as addressed in chapter 4 are noticeably absent.

Finally, joint doctrine needs to address, and provide basic TTPs for, integration on a broader scale. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan continues to prove that integration at the small unit level seems to be effective. However, there exist few, if any, examples of comparable success with large unit integration.

### Conclusion

In February 2003, the Pentagon announced formulation of a study to improve its forcible entry operations (Sherman 2003, 1). According to *Defense News*, the “Joint Forcible Entry Operations Study” involves study of airborne, air, and amphibious assaults, as well as the role of prepositioning and other sea-based concepts. Furthermore, the study is examining the SBCT’s role in such a mission (Sherman 2003, 1). If productive, and inclusive of detailed doctrine, it will go a long way toward improving the nation’s forcible entry capability. As discussed in the 2001 *QDR*, the US needs this capability, especially as anti-access strategies become increasingly the norm in the world.

Even though the US Army officially excluded the SBCT from forcible entry, it would be shortsighted to continue down this path. In 1952, the Air Force envisioned the B-52 as a high-altitude nuclear delivery platform. Fifteen years later, it delivered conventional weapons via low-level flight in Vietnam. Today, it serves forces in Afghanistan in a non-standard close role. The SBCT has capabilities that are beneficial to forcible entry operations. Let us not take fifteen to fifty years to realize this fact.

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